INTRODUCTION
The present paper is a sequel to our paper [2] on differential games of survival and is also related to the work of Fleming [4] on Cauchy problems for degenerate parabolic equations. Our notation and terminology, again outlined in Section 2, is that of [2] .
In our recent paper [3] , using a related stochastic game, we proved that for fixed time differential games our value U is the same as the upper value I'+ of Friedman [5] (see also [I, Sect. 41). In Section 3 of this paper we extend this result to games of survival and prove that if the boundary aF of the terminal set F is regular then U = I' = Q+, where Q+ is the upper value introduced in [2] . We next prove that if there are upper and lower solutions of the related Isaacs-Bellman equation then U is Lipschitz continuous and so, almost everywhere, a solution of the equation. We then consider a nonlinear equation of the form Lv = ; + G(t, x, Vv) = 0 together with the boundary condition v 1 3F = g. Under certain hypotheses on G we show by constructing a related differential game that if there are Cr functions 8r and 8, such that LO, 3 0 > LB, and t$ = @a = g on aF then the value of the differential is a generalized solution of the above boundary value problem. Finally we prove that the solution thus obtained is independent of how a differential game is associated with the problem, that is, the "differential game solution" is unique. 
GAMES OF SURVIVAL
We consider a differential game of survival with control sets Y and 2 which are compact metric spaces. The dynamics of the game are given by dxjdt = &(t) = f(t, x, y, z)
where x E R" and t E [to , cc). f: R x RR"fl x Y x Z-t R" is continuous and satisfies a constant Lipschitz condition in X:
We suppose the trajectory satisfies the initial condition
A closed terminal set F C R x R" such that F 3 [T, co) x Rm for some fixed T is considered and the game ends the first time t, , that the trajectory enters F. The payoff computed is then p(Y, 2) = g(tF > X(tF)) + I tf h(t, x(t), y(t), z(t)) dt (4) to where g: R x R" --f R and h: R x R* x Y x Z are continuous. Player J1 controlling y E Y is trying to maximize P whilst player J2 controlling z E 2 is trying to minimize P. We denote by G(to , x,,) the differential game with dynamics (I), initial condition (3) and payoff (4) . a.e. t, < t < t, + s.
The set of s-delay strategies for J1 is denoted by P,&s). s-delay strategies for Jz are defined similarly and the set denoted by dts(S). For 01 E Pto(0) its value is defined as U(U) = inf[P(arz, a); z E Af2(t,)]. 
We also define upper and lower values (5) 
There are similar definitions (see [2] ) for the s-delay value u,(a) of 01 E r,JO),
Qs-(to , x0> and Q-PO , x0>- 
Q+(to , x0) = v+(t, , x0) = U(t, , x0).
Consider a map 7: Afl(to)
x A$(to) + [to, co) which prescribes a stopping time corresponding to any pair of control functions. 7 is said to be nonanticipating if whenever y'(t) = y(t)
a.e. to G t < T(Y, z), z'(t) = z(t) a.e. to s t < T(Y, z>, then ~(y', a') = ~(y, a). Consider a nonanticipating map T with ~(y, a) < tF(y, z) for ally, z and a real-valued function 6' defined on R x R1". We define a game GT(t,, , x,,; 6) as the game with initial condition (3), dynamics (1) and payoff: p~,tdY, 2) = e(dY, z>, +(y, z)) + ,:,i""' h(t, x(t),y(t), z(t)) dt.
The various upper and lower values for G,(t, , x0; 0) are defined in analogous ways in [2, Section 33 but the particularly important cases are when 0 is itself a value of the game G(r(y, a), x(~(y, a))). The following dynamic programming results are then obtained in [2] . 
EQUALITIES FOR VALUE FUNCTIONS
In this section we extend the identity (13) of Theorem 2.1 to games of survival.
For each (t, x) E Rm+l -intF define %+(t, 4 = ,'iyy y, Qs+(t, 4.
5, + ,r
( 20) and U is continuous at (t, x). aF is Q+-regular if every point of aF is Q+-regular.
We can now prove the following result. for all (to , x0) E Rm-+l -int F. (22) Proof. Theorem 6.4 of [2] states that under these hypotheses V'(to , xo) = Q+(to > xo) so only the identity involving U remains to be proved; the present proof, by contradiction, is similar. As quoted in Theorem 2.1, for fixed time games we know qto 1 x0) = v+cto 7 %I> = ,O+eo , x0>. Suppose (to, x,,) E 8F. Theorem 6.3 of [2] Suppose now (to , x0) E R m+l -F is a point where
Then every trajectory with initial point (t,, , x,,) is contained in a sphere B, = {(t, x): 1 t / + /j x jj < R} for some R > 0. Let
Determine inductively a sequence (t, , x,) in B, for n > 1 with p(tn , x,) > 0 for all rr. Here p(t, X) denotes the distance from (t, X) to F. Suppose (tK , xk) has been determined. Write
and consider G,,(tk , x,; Q+). Then by (19) G7,C is a fixed duration game so Q+(f, , xk) < U,,;(tk , x,; Q+). But by (15) u(tk, xk) = u,,(tk , xk; u, so Q+(t,c , xk) -U(tk , Xk) < U&k, Xa;Q+) -U;,..tk > xk; u).
Therefore, there is a trajectory t(t) in Gr,(tk , xk) such that However, this contradicts (24) so we must have Q+(to ) x0) = LJ(t, ) x0) = V'+(t, , x0).
LIPSCHITZ CONTINUITY
In this section we prove under certain hypotheses that the value functions are Lipschitz continuous and so almost everywhere they are solutions of the Isaac's-Bellman equation. A consequence of Section 3 is that we can confine our attention to the value U, which because it satisfies, for example, identity (15), has several advantages. suppose h is Lipschitz in (t, x) and suppose U is uniformly Lipschitz in (t, x) on aF in any bounded region of R m+l. Then U is unzyormly Lipschitx in any region of the form (R"+l -int F) n ((To < t < T) x R"').
Proof.
The initial part of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.3
of [2] . Consider the set C = B, n (R m+l -intF) for some r > 0. Then any trajectory of (1) with initial point in C is contained for r < T in some set B, .
Suppose (tl , x1) and (tz , xs) E C and write: The map (Y, 4 -(Y*, a*) is a nonanticipating bijection and it induces a map between the spaces of strategies in G(t, , x1) and G(tf , x2). Suppose tI(t) and (a(t) are trajectories corresponding to (y, a) and (y*, z*), respectively, in G(t, , x1) and G(ta , xa). Then from which we deduce I' &(t) -(,(t + u)ll < seK(f-t') -1 u / < 8eK(=+1) -1 u j for tl < t ,( T.
(27) A stopping time T: dl(tl) x AC2(tl) --f R is defined by 7 = ~(y, z) where minb(T, iT1(~)); P(T + 0, 52(7 + u>)) = 0 but min{p(t, El(t)); At + 0, t2(t + u))> > 0 for t, < t < 7.
Then 7 is non-anticipating and r < T. 
The same inequality is true if (7 + o, .$(0 + u)) E aF so by the remarks above on strategies in G(t, , x1) and G(tz , x2): BY (15) and so U is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in regions of the form (P+l -int F) n ((T, < t ,< T) x R"). Then the value U of the game is almost everywhere a solution of the equation L+U = 0 satisfying the boundary condition U JaF = g.
Remark.
It is proved in Theorem 7.1 of [2] that the existence of functions o1 and 0, as above implies aF is Q+-regular.
Therefore, by Theorem 3.2 of the present paper U = V+ = Q+, so that V+ and Q+ also satisfy the equation and boundary condition. Then the value V of the game is almost everywhere a solution of the equation L-V = 0 satisfying the boundary condition V (aF == g.
NONLINEAR PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
We now apply Theorem 4.3 to obtain results for boundary value problems for certain non-linear partial differential equations. This extends work of Fleming [4] on the Cauchy problem for such equations. We construct a generalized solution, that is a function differentiable almost everywhere which at points of differentiability satisfies the equation. As in Section 1 F C R x R" denotes a closed set such that F 3 [T, CCJ) x Rm for some fixed T. Also t E [to , co) and x x R". Consider the nonlinear partial differential operator Lv = %/at + G(t, x, Vv).
and G(t, X, p) is uniformly Lipschitz in all variables. Further, we suppose there is a constant B, such that 1 G(t, x, 0)l < B, .
For suitable bounds OL, /3 we introduce the control sets together with the boundary condition v lar = g. Here G is un~ormly Lipschiltx in (t, x, p) and satis$es inequality (33). Suppose there are functions 8, and l& both Cl on R m+l -int F such that the derivatives of 8, and 8, are uniformly bounded on Rm+l -int F, 8, = e2 = g on aF and
Then there is a generalized solution V(t, x) of the boundary value problem (40) in any region of the form (R" -int F) A ((T, < t < T) x R").
Consider the differential game with dynamics In Equations (36) and (37) we have, following Fleming, given one way of constructing a differential game associated with a nonlinear equation. However, the solution obtained is independent of how the differential game is constructed. Consider now the situation of Theorem 5.1. Suppose again that A, and A, are differential games associated with (40), with value functions Vl(t, x), Vz(t, x), respectively, both satisfying the boundary value problem. Suppose there is some point (to , x0) E R"+l -F where VI@" , X") -v&l , x0) = 6 > 0. Now suppose 7 is a constant such that 7 < t, for any trajectory from (to , x,,) in both A, and A, . Consider fixed time games with the same dynamics and integral payoff as A, and A, , starting at (to , x0) and ending at time 7. By the identity for P-corresponding to (15) we have:
Vl';(&l , x0) = vl,,(t" , x0; VI),
Vz(to , x0) == V2,7(to 7 x0; v,>.
(44 However. we could consider A, with a terminal payoff r, at time T, so by uniqueness for fixed time games we have: Therefore Vz(to , x0) = v1,4to 7 x0; r/,1.
and we can apply the inductive construction of Theorem 3.2 to deduce a contradiction.
Therefore, Vl(to , x0) = Vz(to , x0) for all (to , x0) E Rmfl -intF and the differential game solution is unique. Proof. We proved that a differential game solution exists in (ZP+l -int F) n ((TO < t < T) X R").
If T,' < T,, a differential game solution also exists in (Pl+l -int F) x ((TO' < t < T) x I+).
By Theorem 5.3 the two solutions are equal on the intersection of their domains.
